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ABSTRACT

This booklet traces the emergence of a democratic government in Nigeria through military dictatorship to the writing of a constitution fashioned on the American model. Chapters include: (1) "Prologue"; (2) "Nigeria Defined"; (3) "Tragedy and Recovery: The First Republic and the Federal Military Government"; (4) "The Making of the Second Republic: Democracy Reborn"; and (5) "Nigeria and the United States." Monographs in FPA's Headline Series are published approximately four times a year and are intended as a resource for teachers and students in the foreign policy area. Each monograph: is about a world area or topic; is written by a noted scholar; is brief (usually 64 pages); is written to be highly readable; and includes basic background, maps, charts, discussion guides, and suggested reading. (EH)

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FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
Headline Series

ED 414 235

NIGERIA

Power and Democracy in Africa

by Jean Herskovits

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

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

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1

Prologue

Ten A.M. on October 1, 1979, and through the drizzle that followed the torrents of morning rain came the sun. The symbolism for Westerners, who had joined thousands of Nigerians to witness the historic moment, was perfect. At that precise hour Nigeria's military kept a vow made four years earlier and handed political power to an elected civilian government.

The head of the Federal Military Government and commander in chief of the armed forces, General Olusegun Obasanjo, was reviewing the traditional National Day parade: army, navy, and air force units; the police; Lagos schoolchildren. In 45 minutes his successor, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, would take the oath as the first executive president and commander in chief of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, a nation of over 80 million—close to one-fifth of Africa's total population, the world's fourth largest democracy, and the sixth largest oil producer.

By 11 o'clock General Obasanjo had quietly stepped back a pace. As he and President Shagari circled the massive parade ground at Tafawa Balewa Square, it was clearly the president's show, though the crowd that filled some 100,000 seats cheered for both, and for the event itself.

A transfer of power from soldiers to civilians is unusual enough; this one was unique. Having set a transition in motion, Nigeria's military rulers kept to it with military precision. It was a transition sufficiently long to allow full consultation and participation in choosing the nation's future course. But it was not so long that people could question intent. It was one without successors openly or secretly handpicked to assure a particular institutional or ideological outcome, though there was a clear preference for institutions that would strengthen the nation's unity.

If at first other African states watched with a combination of detached interest and some doubt, by the time of the Organization of African Unity summit in Khartoum, Sudan, in 1978, other heads of state acknowledged the importance of Nigeria's example. Some were pleased; others begged Nigeria's military rulers to consider the pressure that their example was generating elsewhere. Might they even reconsider their decision to step down? They would not, and that encouraged other African military leaders, some of whom had produced their own plans to hand power over to civilians, with Nigeria's program providing the stimulus.

Nigeria's Supreme Military Council needed no prompting from outside their borders to keep them to their word. Nigerians are a very political people, their commitment to participating in their own governance deeply ingrained by precolonial traditions. They had taken seriously the democratic facets of their experience as a British colony, and none among them, soldier or civilian, regarded the military rule that had come in 1966 as other than a "temporary aberration."

Nigeria's democracy had taken shape according to a carefully planned four-year timetable, with representative civilians making key decisions at every point, and with open and widespread popular debate informing and even, at some stages, instructing those who made the decisions.

The Constitution was fashioned on the American model—a federation with an executive president, the separation of powers and an independent judiciary—though it also contained some

distinctively Nigerian features to suit the country's special needs. It was a Constitution that was of, by and for Nigerians, a fact that would surprise no one who knew the country. If the new Constitution resembled the American one, it was not because of any attachment to American examples simply because they were American, but rather because Nigerians had long acknowledged certain similarities between their country and the United States: size, complexity, diversity, great resources both natural and human, whose benefits must reach a wide range of politically alert people with divergent and at times conflicting interests.

NIGERIA'S REGIONS

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Nigeria at independence was divided into three regions, a legacy of British rule: the North dominated by the Hausa, the West by the Yoruba, and the East by the Ibo. The Midwest Region was carved out of the West in 1963. In 1967, the Federal Military Government in Lagos replaced the regions with 12 states.

Inset: **Nigeria, with one-fifth the population of Africa, occupies only 3 percent of the continent's landmass.**

2

Nigeria Defined

When people speak of parts of the world that used to be European colonies, they often raise the question: Are these arbitrarily defined geographical entities truly nations? The question seems particularly relevant in the case of Africa, whose boundaries are the product of European surgery and suturing in the late 19th century rather than the result of internal consolidation brought about for reasons of geography and history.

The question overlooks two points. One is that national boundaries are not immutable; they change frequently over the course of history. And, second, there is no rule which says that to exist as a nation the people within the changing boundaries have to share one language, one religion or even one culture. Given the presence of the Scots and the Welsh, let alone the Irish, does Britain qualify as a nation? What of the Flemings and the Walloons in Belgium: Do the differences of language, religion and culture make Belgium less a country in the world's eyes? What even of the United States?

It was indisputably the British who delineated the outline of the country that after 1914 would be called Nigeria. A near-rectangle on the West African coast, Nigeria extends some 1,000 kilometers north from the Gulf of Guinea, and measures more

than 1,200 kilometers from east to west. Though its climate is tropical throughout, it has a range of geographical features that have contributed to the heterogeneity of its peoples. Broadly divided into two zones, savanna and rain forest, it also has areas of mangrove swamp in the far south, especially in the delta of the great Niger river, from which the country derives its name. And in the east-central and eastern-border regions of the country, there are highlands of 1,200 meters or more in height.

These features, combined with one of Africa's greatest scourges, the tsetse fly, which is present throughout the forest and in parts of the savanna, have had critical historical impact on the country's peoples, its economy, and even its possibilities of internally produced consolidation. Where there is the tsetse fly, cattle and horses cannot survive; that, in turn, has broad implications for diet, transportation and agricultural technology.

Equally important are the implications for conquest: the tsetse fly and the forest stopped invading cavalry as man could not. The hills and mountains provided refuge; so too did the swamps and creeks far to the south, which must have been as unfathomable to African outsiders as they were to the succession of European explorers trying to solve the great geographical mystery of the Niger.

Geography and disease contributed to Nigeria's complexity, past and present. One measure of that complexity is the diversity of languages and ethnic groups. In Nigeria there are, by the most recent and careful count, 395 different languages. These are not dialects but mutually unintelligible languages—one-quarter of all those spoken on the African continent. Most of them come from four language groups, though six other groups are represented. Within each of these large groups are language families, just as within the Indo-European language group there are the Romance, Germanic, Slavic and other families.

Thanks to linguistic research, we know that the people speaking these languages, the ancestors of present-day Nigerians, had to have been in the area—but out of contact with one another—for a very long time. Precisely how long is not known. In the Niger delta no two neighboring languages are as closely

related as all of the Bantu languages spoken throughout most of the east, central and southern two-thirds of Africa, and we know that Bantu-speakers have populated those areas for 2,000 years.

We do know that by 900 B.C. there was iron smelting just north of the confluence of the Niger and Benue rivers, and that by the ninth century A.D. there was at Igbo-Ukwu, in the eastern part of the country near the fringe of the forest, a society rich and specialized enough to produce superb bronze work. Bronzes have been found in the west (Ife) that date from the 12th century and in the southwest (Benin), from the 13th.

Over hundreds of years, some groups of Nigerians, especially those along the trade routes, developed elaborate political systems—states, confederations, even empires. Other groups had different kinds of political organization, more local, less hierarchical, more democratic in the sense of the New England town meeting. The political systems, for the most part, developed internally; what was imposed from outside came from conquering neighbors, not from far-flung imperialism.

Trade stimulated political organization and encouraged specialization, which led to the development of arts as well as crafts. It also brought outside influences. Beginning about the tenth century A.D., the major one was that of Islam. Northern traders crossed the Sahara and carried with them their religious practices as well as the written Koran, a potential tool of literacy.

Atlantic and seaborne trade, and consequently European influences, were not of even marginal importance until the 16th century, and then for the next 200 years only in the Niger delta. With the exception of the slave trade's effect on coastal areas by the late 18th century, Europe's full impact—economic, religious, educational and ultimately political—would not be felt in large parts of what would become Nigeria until the late 19th century. By then states had risen, fallen, and reemerged in different form. Islam had not just penetrated here and there, but in the early 19th century it had swept by the sword through the north, stopped only by hills and forests.

The Europeans, starting with the Portuguese, had come for a variety of reasons. Africa's primary attraction in the beginning was not the slave trade but spices. But soon the trade in men to work the New World's plantations surpassed all else.

England was first to react against slavery, again for an array of economic, religious and ethical reasons. Those same reasons brought English missionaries, explorers and administrators to Nigeria, especially after the region's economic potential in such commodities as palm oil was apparent.

Britain's Legacy

Nigeria, as we know it today, emerged out of a late 19th-century determination on the part of the British and other Europeans to exclude each other from African soil and then to consolidate what they already had secured in the face of often fierce African resistance. Vast, diverse, difficult to control Nigeria, as few other places, challenged the ingenuity of its British overlords. Endemic malaria and yellow fever further helped deter permanent European settlement.

British administrators, as they began to be aware of Nigeria's historical diversity, were respectful of some of its traditions while disregarding others. The first governor-general of Nigeria was Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard. Lugard's particular views of what to change and what to leave alone were formulated during his years in India and as governor of a separate North before Nigeria's "amalgamation" in 1914. In the North he had followed a policy of indirect rule: traditional authority was left virtually alone, indeed in some cases strengthened. Its pyramidal structure provided a continuity of government while ensuring ultimate British control simply by placing a British official at the very top. Lugard had also seen to it that the Muslim north's cultural traditions were protected, especially from alien religious influences: Christian missionaries and the Western education they brought with them, which attracted many converts in the south, were forbidden in the far north.

Pleased with how his system was working in the North, Lugard sought after 1914 to extend it to the south. But the model

didn't fit, nor did it fit in that area of the north later called the Middle Belt. Patterns of rule in the south were quite different: though government was religiously based, as it was in the North, there was a far wider range of participation, even in the centralized pre-British states, and in some cases checks and balances effectively hampered the arbitrary exercise of power.

Further, with missionary penetration of the south under way since the 1840s, some Western-educated Africans actively opposed a continuing British presence without African participation. In the coastal towns of Lagos and Calabar, they sought a political role. The Lagos press, which they ran, had been shouting about "no taxation without representation" as early as the 1880s.

The British attempt to impose the apparently tidy administrative system of the North on the south brought varied reactions, most of them hostile. In trying to remold tradition, colonial administrators ran into resistance from those who took the Western world at its word: that the goal should be self-government along Western lines. What did that mean but African leadership, educated in Western traditions as well as in their own?

Thus a few decisions made in the early decades of British rule in Nigeria had major consequences for the country's future. The most critical decision undoubtedly was Lugard's insistence that the country be ruled as two parts—not four or more, as others proposed. The north-south division has continued to plague Nigeria's politics, at least psychologically, ever since. Educational policy only reinforced the split: Nigerians from the south, who had had far greater access to Western education, assumed that they thereby had a superior right to rule; Nigerians from the north, by no means granting such a right, nonetheless feared they would be outclassed in the competition for positions of power and influence in a modern Nigeria.

The tenacity of these views became clear in later decades. In the interwar years, the debate was among Britons, not Nigerians: Should the Western-educated eventually take over governing Nigeria at all? Were they not, rather, an insidious influence on

their more traditional brothers? If there was a contradiction between that view and the "civilizing mission" said to have propelled Europe overseas, many Europeans did not see it.

During the 1920s and especially in the 1930s, the issue of political change was largely moot. There was no movement on that front apart from the important precedent in the south in 1922 of allowing a few Africans to be elected by urban constituents to a legislative council that acted in an advisory capacity. No one seriously thought that an independent Nigeria was only a few decades away. With the Great Depression, the world's economic troubles impinged everywhere. In Nigeria the stress on producing cash crops for export redoubled: palm oil and kernels from the east; cocoa from the west; cotton and groundnuts from the north. Tin and a little coal were the only minerals. The one improvement in the infrastructure was development of the railways, begun soon after 1900 and financed from Nigerian taxes. Their purpose was to carry the primary produce to the coastal ports and to facilitate moving British goods to the country's major interior markets, as a map of the railways makes clear. To go from Lagos to Port Harcourt, in the 1950s, for example, one had to travel first all the way north to Kaduna. What roads were built connected with the railways.

World War II brought to Nigeria, as to most of Europe's colonies, a new political drive. Since the war was fought in the name of freedom, Africans and others who contributed to an Allied victory felt that self-determination should be their reward. Colonial powers did not see it immediately: even in the early 1950s many Europeans with colonial experience talked of independence as still decades away.

The idea of self-government, however eventual, was singularly British. No doubt with 1776 and subsequent precedents in mind, Britain conceded the miniscule representation of Nigerians in the legislative council in 1922—important because it began the elective process. By 1945, the then governor, Sir Arthur Richards, set out proposals for a new constitution (formulated, however, without Nigerian participation). He hoped, he said, "(a) to promote the unity of Nigeria, (b) to provide adequately

within that desire for the diverse elements which make up the country, and (c) to secure greater participation by Africans in the discussion of their own affairs."

He succeeded in the last of these goals, though still allowing only indirect elections. But in attempting to achieve the first two, he produced the very opposite of what he wished. For he further entrenched the north-south division, and even complicated it by dividing the south into west and east. When that reform was solidified in 1954, Nigeria became a federation of three regions which—not the center—held residual powers. This made two-against-one politics, in which representatives from two regions ganged up on those from the third, all but inevitable in Lagos. That grew into the tragedy of Nigeria's first republic.

Ethnic Politics

The outcome might have been no different if Nigerians had been consulted. By 1945 the articulate political voices were not those of tradition but of Western-educated Nigerians, almost all of whom had spent some time studying in Britain or the United States. They were all from the southern part of Nigeria, and they were nearly all from the two largest ethnic groups there: the Yoruba in the southwest, and the Ibo in the southeast.

Those two groups, along with the largest one in the north, the Hausa (or more precisely, Hausa-Fulani) made up some 50 percent of Nigeria's population. In each of the three regions, one of them was dominant—and their leaders were determined to keep it so. Political parties had started in the south in Lagos in the 1920's, with the founding of the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) to contest the new legislative council seats. The party was founded by Herbert Macaulay (of Sierra Leonean-Yoruba descent), who is called the father of Nigerian nationalism. In 1934 students, largely in Lagos, started the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM). It tried to be truly national and displaced the NNDP in the 1938 legislative council elections.

What eclipsed the NYM was the formation in 1944, by one of

its members, of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). Its founder was to become a giant of Nigeria's political history: Nnamdi Azikiwe. Zik, as he was known, had an American education, a national outlook, a compelling charisma, and—important for the fight he wanted to wage—a newspaper. But whether his outlook was truly national quickly became a matter of dispute. An Ibo, he was accused, as were other political leaders from the other "majority" ethnic groups, of putting the cause of "his people" ahead of all others.

Chief Obafemi Awolowo, like Zik, a figure who was to loom large for decades in Nigeria's politics, was also educated abroad (as a barrister in London). Awolowo has long been acknowledged a keen analyst of Nigeria's polity, driving single-mindedly to implement his solutions to its problems. As persuasive among his followers as Zik was among his, Awolowo from the start chose to focus his energies and seek his support among the Yoruba, of which he is a part.

The Yoruba had earlier formed a group interested in cultural preservation and consolidation; so also had the Ibo. In both cases the cultural groups gave rise to political organizations. Awolowo called his party the Action Group. It was formed in 1951 to fight elections to be held under the new Constitution, which provided for regional assemblies with, for the first time, legislative powers. Elections to the regional assemblies were still indirect (through local government authorities), as were elections to a new central house of representatives (through the regional assemblies).

Because he had purposefully built his party on a Yoruba base, Awolowo was charged with introducing what one critic called tribal nationalism into Nigeria's politics. The contrary view holds that, with Zik already in the field, and with politics already regionalized by the British, a new approach, less nationalistic, was essential to constructing an effective political organization. Awolowo himself argued that in a country so diverse, the way to move from a sense of local loyalty to a commitment to the nation was by stages, consolidating first a secure regional identity.

With the entry of the clearly Western-based Action Group



NIGERIA'S MAIN ETHNIC GROUPS

onto the scene, and the simultaneous creation of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), Nigeria's third major political party, the tripartite division and the ethnic domination in each region of "majority" over "minorities" only deepened. The NPC, formed to contest the 1951 elections, made its purview clear in its choice of name. Its leader, a Fulani, was the Sardauna of Sokoto, regal in the most complete sense of the word—position, bearing, style, outlook. The heir apparent to the Sultanship of Sokoto, the most important political and religious position in the Muslim north, he commanded respect and wielded power and authority in the eyes of all, including the British.

Given the composition of the three major parties, the interests, political and other, of the non-Yoruba, non-Ibo, non-Hausa peoples were not high on the agendas of the country's leading politicians. As Nigeria went from one constitutional conference to another, inching its way to independence, two tensions dominated all else. One was the north-south tension, felt with startling force on March 31, 1953, as southern representatives dramatically walked out of the legislative council in reaction to successful northern efforts to block a motion for Nigeria's independence in 1956. Riots and killings of southerners followed in Kano, the North's largest, most cosmopolitan city, and northern leaders, who had been vilified in Lagos, seriously contemplated secession. Fear and resentment would plague Nigeria's next decades.

The other tension stemmed from frictions between majority and minority groups within each region. The British did appoint a commission of inquiry, which had no Nigerian members, to "inquire into the fears of minorities and the means of allaying them." It filed its report in 1958—two years before independence. The commission acknowledged the fears, but said that creating more states to allay those fears was unnecessary. Furthermore, to do so would perforce delay independence, they said, thus imposing an impossible choice on Nigeria's political leaders. Nigeria paid dearly for heeding the commission's advice. It became clear later that additional states could have been set up and functioning in less than two years.

When Nigeria became independent of Britain on October 1, 1960, it was a federation of three regions, with a coalition government—an unlikely combination of Azikiwe's NCNC and, as senior partner (because it had won more votes in the December 1959 parliamentary election), the Sardauna's NPC. For neither the first nor last time, Nigeria's politicians, despite their rhetoric, demonstrated their pragmatism and the lack of major ideological rifts in Nigerian politics. The prime minister was Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the NPC, a modest, self-effacing man of compelling moral stature but believed to be subordinate in nearly every respect to the Sardauna.

The tumult and the shouting at Nigeria's independence were

extravagant. Outsiders, the British in particular, joined in the celebration. They saw black Africa's largest nation—a "sleeping giant," people said then—as a "model of democracy" and a proud achievement for all. They were not entirely wrong.

What is remarkable from a 20-year perspective is that Nigerians embraced democratic traditions as strongly as they did, and particularly that they held on to them so firmly. Their colonial heritage was a commitment to liberal democracy, but like other colonial subjects, they had hardly seen democracy in practice. Only a few thousand of the 35 million Nigerians had had the opportunity to vote until less than a decade before independence. There were no nationwide direct elections to a national legislature until December 1959, and even then the Northern Region denied women the vote.

Until independence itself, Nigeria had had no opportunity to experience the essence of democratic government—that is, the peaceful exchange of one set of leaders for another when dissatisfaction, or the promise of greater satisfaction, so dictates. Judging by the example of the colonial administration, Nigerians could assume that "once in power, always in power," and the constraints of ethnicity, history, and regional structure only served to reinforce that view.

Nigeria managed nevertheless to make democratic institutions function for a time, and in the process increased the commitment of growing numbers of Nigerians to think of themselves as just that, Nigerians.

3

Tragedy and Recovery: The First Republic and the Federal Military Government

The first decade of Nigeria's independence dramatized the difficulties of coming of age as a nation in the 20th century. The problems were not necessarily different from those that had faced a range of Western countries, as varied in their historical experience in forging a nation as France and Italy. Indeed, some of the most striking parallels to Nigeria's experience are to be found in the United States, particularly in the traumas—traumas that, in the end, strengthened both the countries and their people.

The major difference is the 20th-century pace. During the course of its first 200 years, America saw sectional tension, corruption, assorted violence, a flight from the land to ever-more-troubled cities. It saw civil war and political assassination. In less than one-tenth of that time, Nigeria faced all that and more, for in the late 20th century, the revolution in communications has placed great demands on governments.

Nigerians in 1960 were full of hope for their future. Independence was a heady thing, and that—rather than creating a

durable nation—was the universal goal of the nationalist movement against Europe's colonial rule. Apprehensions were, for the time being, eclipsed by euphoria.

The country's economy and thus the resources available to the new government were modest in scale. Though one or two oil companies were already actively exploring, no one imagined the revolutionary changes that petroleum would bring in a decade. Agriculture was the economic base, with the stress on export commodities, though at that stage Nigeria was still feeding itself. The "rich" region was the Western; its staple was cocoa. The Northern Region produced mainly groundnuts but also cotton; the Eastern, the poorest at the time, palm oil and related products.

Nigeria's per capita gross national product (GNP) in 1960 was $200 and the demands on its revenues were enormous. For a country of some 50 million, Nigeria's basic infrastructure was woefully inadequate. For example, at independence there was not one paved road connecting the north with either southern region. There were only 209 hospitals, with 13,060 beds. As for schools, there were 15,911 primary schools (all but 12 percent of them in the south) and only 397 schools of all other types.

Against this background, Nigeria began to operate its new democracy. Azikiwe and Awolowo had left their regional premierships for Lagos, the federal capital. Azikiwe came in the nonelective capacity of the first Nigerian governor-general (an office transformed into the ceremonial—not executive—presidency when the country became a republic in 1963). Awolowo, believing he would win in the next federal elections, had entered the house of representatives as leader of the opposition to the governing coalition of NPC and NCNC.

In the Northern Region, the leader of the NPC, the Sardauna of Sokoto, continued as premier, impressing upon the country his primary commitment to its development. In Lagos, a man most thought of as his lieutenant, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa—gentle, intelligent, uncharismatic—continued as prime minister in a mounting atmosphere of high drama uncongenial to such a leader.

In all too quick succession Nigeria moved from challenge to crisis. The first crisis exploded in April 1961 when the Federal House voted to carve up the West and create a new Midwest Region. Carving up the North and East to establish counterpart regions was not mentioned, then or later. The Midwest Region was created after a referendum in 1963—but in the meanwhile a state of emergency had been declared in the West, and later Chief Awolowo and 30 others, mainly Action Group members, were arrested on charges of treasonable felony and conspiracy in a plot to overthrow Nigeria's government. Tried and found guilty on the basis of evidence assembled by the largely British-officered Special Branch, they were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. The High Court judge and, later, the chief justice—both Yoruba—declared in their judgments that when "his [Awolowo's] ambition of becoming the first prime minister of Nigeria did not materialize . . . his hopes were shattered, that he lost faith in the ballot box, and that he developed a sense of frustration which culminated in the formation of the Tactical Committee whose main objective was to take over the government of the federation. . . ." To no one's surprise, Awolowo's supporters continued to disagree with this view, despite the evidence.

The next explosive issue was the announcement that there would be a new census in September 1963. Nigeria may never have had an accurate census because, ever since colonial attempts to do a head count, people have given inaccurate responses. At first they associated the census with tax collection and the result was an under count. From the 1950s on, Nigerians realized that population would determine the number of their representatives in the legislature as well as the distribution of federal revenue.

The regular ten-year census had been held on schedule in 1962. When the results began leaking out, there were charges of political manipulation. Rumor had it that the Northern Region had a larger population than the Eastern and Western regions combined. Southerners did not believe it, for though the Northern Region was surely vast in area, it was, as anyone could see, sparsely peopled compared to the densely populated south.

Surely, said southerners, this was not an accurate count but a political one—an effort on the part of the North to take over the whole country.

The prime minister, sensitive to such charges, personally looked into the matter and announced that there would be another count. But when the preliminary results came in in February 1964, a fresh crisis exploded. Out of a total population of 55 million, the Northern Region had an absolute majority. The crisis caused by the second census was exacerbated by labor troubles, including a remarkably successful general strike; violence in the Middle Belt among one of the largest minority groups, the Tiv; and a political realignment which made formal the country's division into north and south.

Amidst charges of corruption, rigging and intimidation—many of the charges well-founded—a disastrous federal election was held in December 1964. The NCNC and Action Group had formed an alliance and decided to boycott the election. Their tactic misfired. Azikiwe, as president, refused to call on Balewa to form the new government and insisted on another election. But unable to force a new full-scale election, he found his bluff called and eventually did turn to Balewa. For the first time, there were rumors of an army takeover, for West Africa had seen its first military coup in Togo in 1963. Others said there would never be a coup in Nigeria: Nigeria is too big; the army is too small. . . .

The First Coup

The prime minister did what he could to conciliate the opposition and called for new elections to the government of the Western Region, where the boycott had been most effective. No one in Nigeria is proud of the events that followed. As November election time approached, campaigning came to include murder, arson and lesser forms of intimidation. Many believed a coup was all but inevitable. It came on January 15, 1966.

Officers in the army, said to have been the most truly national of Nigeria's institutions at that time, had watched the deteriorating situation in the country with unconcealed alarm. Some even

talked quite openly of the need to do something to save Nigeria. The coup was organized in Kaduna, in the Northern Region, by a small group led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. In the early hours of the 15th most of the key civilian leaders were killed, including the prime minister and the federal minister of finance, the premiers of the Northern and Western regions. In Lagos, every senior Northern army officer the coup-makers could find—seven in all—was slain. The southern fatalities were three officers: two from the Western Region, and one from the Eastern Region.

The initial reaction, notably among civilians and especially, but not exclusively, in the south, was relief and rejoicing. But when it became apparent that most of the plotters were Ibo and, whatever their intentions, most of their victims, northerners, the results were traumatic.

The effects were felt first by the army and then by the nation. The coup ripped apart the national fabric of the army. Not a large army, it had a total of 482 male officers on the eve of the coup (up from 57 Nigerians—plus British officers—at independence). In all units there had been a deliberate effort to mix officers from the four regions as much as possible. In such circumstances the killing of senior officers had a devastating impact.

In a midday broadcast on January 15, Major Nzeogwu declared the Constitution suspended and regional government dissolved. But he had not established his control in Lagos, and a hastily assembled Cabinet decided to hand over the government temporarily not to the majors but to the first Nigerian to have become General Officer Commanding, Major General J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi. An Ibo, he had taken over from his British predecessor less than a year before.

Lingering optimism about an end to internal strife was crushed in May with Decree No. 34, the "centralizing decree," which abolished the federation, substituted a unitary state, and unified the federal and regional civil services. The decree was based on the recommendations of a senior civil servant and, importantly, an Ibo. Ethnic tensions, long smoldering, erupted.

Northerners, taunted in their cities about their slain leaders and already suspicious of "Ibo domination," saw a unified civil service as a new attempt to subject educationally disadvantaged Northerners to permanent "domination" by southerners. Uncontrolled mobs in the North mercilessly slew innocent southerners, largely Ibo. Grievances were no longer confined to any one section of the country: all were thinking ever more sectionally, simplistically and in stereotypes, which intensified fears, tensions and anger.

When the second coup came on July 29, 1966, it was by Northern officers. Ironsi, who in an uncharacteristic spurt of energy had gone on a tour to gain the support of traditional rulers in the Northern and Western regions, was killed in Ibadan along with the military governor of the Western Region. More than a day and a night of uncertainty followed, as the coup-makers negotiated Nigeria's future with senior army officers. Many believed the North would secede, but that did not happen.

Gowon Takes Charge

Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, who had barely escaped with his life in January and had become Ironsi's chief of staff, became the new head of state. At 31, Gowon was not the obvious successor to Ironsi. He was not the most senior officer, and he had acted with loyalty to his commander in chief, making the rounds of the units after the January 15 coup to calm Northern soldiers enraged by the deaths of their most senior and highly respected officers. But he had also warned his commander in chief of the danger of not bringing to justice the coup-making majors, a principal cause of the July 29 countercoup.

A modest, self-effacing man, he was a Northerner, but not a Hausa and not a Muslim. He was instead from one of the minority groups of the Middle Belt and, like his catechist father, an Anglican. Because he was taking charge of a country riven with paranoia on regional, ethnic and increasingly religious grounds, the fact that he straddled the usual categories (which he disliked, as he did all ethnic and religious groupings) and did not fit the frightening stereotypes was profoundly important. It was

important not least for giving a measure of confidence, really for the first time, to minorities around the country, who, after all, constituted half of Nigeria's population.

In his hastily drafted speech to the country on August 1, Gowon included a sentence that haunted him in the months ahead. "I have come to believe," he said, "that we cannot honestly continue in this wise, as the basis of trust and confidence in our unitary system of government has not been able to stand the test of time . . . the base for unity is not there, or is so badly rocked, not only once but several times." Those words would be cited again and again as proof that Nigeria was not, after all, a nation: the head of state himself had said so. Taken in context, however, the words had a rather different meaning, for he went on to say that "we should review the issue of our national standing and see if we can help stop the country from drifting away into utter destruction. . . ." What he was denying was not the country's unity, but the unitary as distinguished from federal form of government.

In contrast to Ironsi, Gowon promptly moved to strengthen his political base. He pardoned Chief Awolowo and released him from prison. He affirmed his commitment to democracy, announced that he would return the country to civilian rule, and repealed Decree 34, thus abolishing the unworkable unitary government.

A form of government that had not even been thought about before now surfaced: a confederation. The chief sponsor was Lieutenant Colonel C. O. Ojukwu, who had become governor of the Eastern Region under Ironsi. Ojukwu had been one of the first university graduates (Oxford) commissioned in the Nigerian army, and circumstances as well as his ability had thrust him forward in 1966. Despite his refusal to recognize Gowon's leadership after the July 29 coup, he had remained governor.

The atmosphere in the country was so tense and unsettled that rumor could easily set off violence—and when violence broke out, the government in Lagos seemed powerless to contain it. Gowon convened an *ad hoc* constitutional conference, but it ended in failure. The delegation from the Eastern Region never returned

from an adjournment. After further killings in September, Ojukwu had summoned Easterners from all over the country to come home, and home they went. Those already there, including the delegation to the constitutional conference, stayed. The other regional delegations did return to Lagos, but with excessively broad and conflicting mandates, and that effort at constitution-making simply died, the victim of heightened tension.

The one external effort to resolve the crisis came from the Ghanaian head of state, General J. A. Ankrah, who persuaded Gowon and Ojukwu to meet at Aburi, Ghana, in January 1967. At this meeting Ojukwu, always patronizing toward his old colleague "Jack" and publicly disdainful of both his will and his ability, had extracted Gowon's consent to a plan for a confederation that might have divided Nigeria forever. The civil servants in Lagos, who enjoyed far more power under military rule than they had under civilians, were horrified and brought strong pressure to bear on Gowon to renounce the plan, which he did. If Gowon was guilty, as Ojukwu charged, of reneging on a firm agreement, it turned out that in so doing he preserved Nigeria as a strong and united nation.

Biafra: A 'Brothers' War'

Whether or not Eastern secession had been in the planning before the Aburi meeting of Gowon and Ojukwu, it certainly was after. By then crude oil was transforming the Eastern Region from the poorest to the richest, and this had no small effect on furthering plans to pull the region out of the union. On May 30, 1967, Ojukwu declared the former Eastern Region sovereign under the name of Biafra. That was three days after Gowon had announced probably the most important decision in Nigeria's modern history—the reorganization of the country into 12 states, replacing the four regions. The 20-year wish of Nigeria's minorities was granted and, ironically, so was the wish of the south—the Eastern Region in particular—to divide the Northern Region. One of the new states was Lagos, created to insure that the Western Region would not stay out of the federation should the Eastern Region secede.

On July 6 federal troops fired the first shot and crossed into Biafra. Nigeria's postindependence tragedies culminated in the greatest tragedy of all: a "brothers' war." The causes and the blame will be argued for decades to come.

Here the point that matters most is this: Paradoxically, the civil war, however tragic and traumatic, may actually have strengthened the nation that emerged; it has been true of other civil wars in other eras and in other places. But before then, the world, especially the Western world, became very much aware of Biafra as a result of the most skillful use Africans had ever made of the media, particularly the Western media. The cry of "genocide" brought shillings and dimes from British and American schoolchildren. That there was no genocide either in policy or practice took years to register outside Nigeria. This is not to say that the deaths, especially of civilians through food shortages, were not unacceptably high. Though the figures are far from certain, the most carefully arrived-at estimate remains 600,000 dead, civilian and military, on both sides. Many of those were in Iboland, and many of them were the very young, the very old, and the very poor—not those who had planned and executed the secession itself in their name. But the toll was not the millions—up to 6 million—that had alarmed the world, and it was not genocide.

Nor was it a religious war, as the outside world also thought. It is true that most easterners were practicing Christians, and that there were almost no Muslims in the Eastern Region. It is true, too, that the Northern Region, especially the far north, was predominantly Muslim, and historically, since the Fulani jihad (religious war) in the early 1800s, Islam as a religion was associated by many non-Muslims with violence. Their fears had revived during the years of the First Republic, when the premier of the Northern Region, as much the traditional religious leader as a political one, turned his massive energies to proselytizing and converting non-Muslims in the North. Where would it end? southerners asked. The anti-Ibo violence in the Northern Region in 1966 could easily be seen as anti-Christian—part of a new jihad.

The fact remained that one third or more of the population of Nigeria minus Biafra was Christian. There were Christians in the northern states as well as in the West, Midwest, and Lagos. Nigeria's head of state during the war was a Christian.

A final important point is that most governments—African ones in particular—did not officially support the breakup of Nigeria, in recognition that it could set a precedent for the splintering and shattering of the continent. (The African countries that did recognize Biafra were Tanzania, Zambia, the Ivory Coast and Gabon.)

In one of the greatest ironies of the war, the non-African countries whose governments did support Biafra, openly and officially or clandestinely, all had political ideologies or goals in Africa repellent to Ibo political leadership: the Portugal of Prime Minister Antonio Salazar; the South Africa of Prime Minister B. J. Vorster; a France that had always regarded a strong Nigeria as the only threat to its own hegemony in West and Central Africa.

It is almost as ironic that the official neutrality of the United States, which refused to sell arms to either side, forced the Nigerians to buy from those with whom they had no ideological affinity: the Soviet Union.

With Biafra's surrender on January 15, 1970, following Ojukwu's flight to the Ivory Coast, Gowon and the government in Lagos embarked on the reconciliation and reconstruction they had been promising from the start. Gowon had prohibited the use of the term "the enemy," referring always to the "rebels" and not to secession but to "Ojukwu's rebellion." In a broadcast just before midnight that night, he said, "I solemnly repeat our guarantees of a general amnesty for those misled into rebellion. We guarantee the personal safety of everyone who submits to federal authority. We guarantee the security of life and property of all citizens in every part of Nigeria, and equality in political rights. We also guarantee the right of every Nigerian to reside and work wherever he chooses in the federation as equal citizens of one united country. It is only right that we should all henceforth respect each other. We should all exercise civic

restraint and use our freedom taking into account the legitimate rights and needs of the other man. There is no question of second-class citizenship in Nigeria."

Words and more words, so the many doubters, especially outside Nigeria, said. But, in fact, an unprecedented and remarkably successful effort to "bind up the wounds" got under way. The reconstruction and reconciliation had no parallel in the aftermath of the world's modern civil wars, outstripping the most usual comparison with the U.S. Civil War, a comparison that paired Gowon and Abraham Lincoln.

The Nigeria of 1970 was far different from that of the First Republic (1963–66). Not only was there a 12-state federation, but its economic base had shifted dramatically from agriculture to oil. In 1965 farming and related industries provided 60 percent of the GNP, and agriculture accounted for 80 percent of total exports, with export crops less than one quarter of total agricultural production. As for oil, "Great strides have been made," wrote one analyst in 1965, making the point that it was certainly available in "commercially exploitable quantities." His crystal ball, however, was cloudy, for he considered it "still unlikely that Nigeria will become a leading world [oil] producer." By 1972 Nigeria was the world's ninth largest producer. (It had repaid its war debts in April that year, largely from oil revenues.) But no one as yet knew how quickly the importance of Nigeria's oil would escalate.

Nigeria needed all the resources it could muster, not only to rebuild but to build for the first time an infrastructure adequate to support the rapid and widespread development that Nigerians were demanding. Though some roads had been paved during the early 1960s, their location was determined more by political power and rewards in each region than by need, and much of the road system in the country still consisted of mere tracks. It was the same story with pipe-borne water, electricity, schools and dispensaries, let alone universities and hospitals. No modern system of telecommunications yet existed. And in cities, a stream of migrants from the countryside strained already inadequate services.

The creation of additional states meant new centers for development and new capitals within the states requiring facilities to run their administrative machinery. The fact that some of the new state governments did run for some time without those facilities simply proved how wrong the British had been in insisting in 1958 that it would take longer than the two years to independence for a newly created nation to function.

The political challenges were no less great than the economic ones. The reunited country, the "One Nigeria" for which many had fought, would have to be governed by civilians democratically chosen. While Gowon's handling of the war's aftermath was widely praised throughout the country, Nigerians waited for the specific steps that would bring them the civilian rule Gowon had promised. As early as 1967 he had appointed civilians to head most ministries. The most prominent among them was Chief Awolowo as Gowon's own deputy. Awolowo had left government soon after the war's end, however, because of disagreement over the timing of the military's departure from politics: he wanted it to come long before the 1976 date Gowon was promising.

"When people ask what's being done to return the country to civilian rule," a senior official in Lagos said in the summer of 1972, "and they look for conferences, and constitutional proposals, and local elections—that will come. Leave aside for now what we have done: the reconstruction, and the reconciliation, even the reorganization of the army which has been so important. The first thing we must have is a census." Ten tormented years had passed since the census that had rocked the First Republic, and under new economic conditions an accurate census was more critical than ever to planning. It not only had to be accurate, it had to be *seen* to be accurate. In the event, it was neither, though careful planning had gone into the complicated exercise.

When the preliminary census results came out in May 1974, political argument exploded. Nervously the government announced that "provisionally" Nigeria had 79.8 million people, up from 55.7 million in 1963. More serious was the distribution: the six northern states were said to have twice as many people as

the six in the south. Old fears revived instantly—along with old accusations.

On October 1, 1974, when Nigerians had expected Gowon to lift the ban on political parties, he instead shocked the nation by announcing the indefinite postponement of the handover to civilians. "It is clear that those who aspire to lead the nation on the return to civilian rule have not learned any lesson from our past experience," he said. "There is no doubt that it would not take them long to return to the old cutthroat politics that once led this nation into serious crisis. . . . [But] what the country and the ordinary citizens want is peace and stability, the only condition under which progress and development are possible."

The disillusionment with Gowon, so long revered as a man of his word, was widespread; it increased further in the months that followed as a result of the government's apparent immobility and corruption. The symbol of the government's ineptitude was the flotilla of ships, carrying over-ordered cement, which extended from Lagos harbor to the horizon. Gowon had been right that his countrymen wanted peace and stability; what he had failed to understand was how much they also wanted democracy. On July 29, 1975, a group of young officers, this time colonels, ousted him and his regime as he attended an Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Uganda. It was not Nigerian history repeating itself, however, for in this coup there was no bloodshed. The foremost commitment of the coup-makers was to return Nigeria to civilian democratic rule.

Milestones in Nigeria's History

1861 • Lagos was first land ceded to Great Britain.

1886 • Colony and Protectorate of Lagos was formed.

1906 • Lagos merged with Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (1899). Marks beginning of effective British administration.

1914 • Northern and Southern Nigeria were "amalgamated" to form Nigeria.

1947 • First legislative council for the entire country was established under Richards Constitution, which also created regional divisions into North, East and West.

1959 • First nationwide direct election to the Federal House of Representatives.

1960 • Independence, October 1.

1963 • First Republic declared, October 1.
• Midwest Region created out of Western Region.

1966 • First Republic ends in January, when the army assumes power.
• Second military coup in July brings then Colonel Yakubu Gowon to power.

1967 • Regions divided into 12 states on May 27.
• Former Eastern Region secedes as Biafra, May 30.
• July civil war: central government vs. former Eastern Region.

1970 • In January, civil war ends with federal victory.

1975 • July military coup overthrows Gowon government.

1976 • In February, General Murtala Muhammed assassinated; replaced by his chief of staff General Olusegun Obasanjo.
• Seven additional states created, making 19.

1978 • In September, elected Constituent Assembly submits draft constitution to military government. Ban on organized politics lifted.

1979 • In July and August Nigerians elect new leaders.
• Second Republic established October 1. Alhaji Shehu Shagari inaugurated president and commander-in-chief of Federal Republic of Nigeria.

4

The Making of the Second Republic: Democracy Reborn

The new regime of General Murtala Muhammed, put at the helm by the coup-makers, attacked Nigeria's problems with extraordinary, unaccustomed energy. Then a brigadier, Muhammed, who came from Kano, was flamboyant and controversial. He had entered Nigerians' consciousness during the civil war, and was known to have been an outspoken critic of Gowon's policies, then and since.

In his first broadcast to the nation, Muhammed spoke briefly and directly: his government would put an end to "drift" which, "if not arrested, would inevitably have resulted in chaos and even bloodshed." He criticized his predecessor for "lack of consultation, indecision, indiscipline, and even neglect."

Apart from retirements and appointments, all "with immediate effect," he mentioned areas of central concern on which he would act shortly. His political program included the creation of new states and moving the federal capital. He cancelled the 1973 census, choosing instead to use the 1963 figures extrapolated for planning purposes.

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That was just the beginning. Probes into corruption of high officials in the previous regime started straight away, as did an inquiry into the cement and other scandals. Throughout the civil service there was a "clearing out of dead woods," in which some 10,000 at all levels were retired. Those at the top often heard the news first over the radio.

On October 1, 1975 came the word Nigerians had been waiting for: the army would hand over power to a popularly elected civilian government no later than October 1, 1979. What was new was not a date, but a precise timetable, with specific steps. A committee to explore the question of creating more states was already at work; it would report in December. A Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) would be appointed a few weeks later, and would have until September 1976—one year—to work up the initial draft. With any newly created states given time "to settle down," the federation would then "embark upon a systematic and deliberate reorganization of . . . local government," leading to local elections "on individual merit without party politics." A partly elected, partly nominated Constituent Assembly would then "consider and accept" the draft Constitution and be dissolved. All of this would be done by October 1978.

At that point the final stage would begin: the lifting of the ban on political activities and thus the formation of political parties, followed by elections, as the then head of state envisaged it, "into the legislatures at state and federal levels, as prescribed by the new Constitution." The handover itself would follow by October 1, 1979.

The process showed a profound commitment on the part of Nigeria's new military rulers, not just to democracy, but to the belief that man can find institutions that will restrain his excesses and solve his proven problems. Those institutional measures were to be designed so that Nigeria would not repeat its past mistakes and the tragedy that had followed from them.

The intentions of the new rulers were manifest when the head of state addressed the just-appointed 49-man Constitution Drafting Committee. (Its 50th member, Chief Awolowo, had refused

to serve on the ground that he had learned of his appointment on the radio.) "This administration," Muhammed said, "believes strongly that the provisions of the Constitution can be used for removing or minimizing some of our basic problems. The fear of the predominance of one region over another has, for instance, been removed to a large extent by the simple constitutional act of creating more states. Your aim, therefore, must be to devise a constitution which will help to solve other problems. . ."

The Supreme Military Council would not dictate to the CDC, but the council had considered the past, including sets of political conditions to be avoided (which Muhammed listed for the CDC), and reached the conclusion that the country required:

(1) genuine and truly national political parties;

(2) an executive presidential system of government with president, vice-president, and cabinet chosen in a manner that "reflects the federal character of the country";

(3) An independent judiciary;

(4) Such corrective institutions as the Corrupt Practices Tribunal and Public Complaints Bureau; and

(5) Constitutional restriction on the number of states to be further created.

Thus the momentous process began; it would continue without a misstep, despite further national trauma, until the climactic October 1st four years later.

Not all changes in the Nigeria of the late 1970s were as sudden or dramatic as the new political timetable, for the Muhammed regime had inherited a very different Nigeria from the one Gowon had found in 1966. There had been a civil war; there were now vast and rising oil revenues (with expectations to match). There were new states, and the federation had evolved a far stronger center than before.

What assured the strength of the central government was something the Gowon regime had simply done by decree at the end of the war: it had revised the system of revenue allocation. The principle of derivation was virtually gone from the formula; a criterion called "need" was added to population size; and off-shore oil was declared a national asset. That gave Lagos the

resources to implement many programs throughout the country—and to compensate areas previously disadvantaged. Highways, schools and piped water—all rendered Nigeria, and not least its rural areas, nearly unrecognizable in 1977 to one who had seen it five years before.

While inflation had risen, agriculture had seriously declined, and cities, bursting with new arrivals, had high unemployment and crime rates. Nigeria was sharing not just the problems of development, but the problems of the world in the 1970s. If Nigerians were not impatient, for one of the rare times in their history, it was because they felt not just movement but progress, and the hope for more. They also felt that Nigeria had new stature in the world. For the Muhammed government's style was apparent also in foreign policy, especially in regard to the Angola crisis in late 1975.

After Assassination, a Smooth Transition

But suddenly catastrophe struck Nigeria again. On February 13, 1976, just ten days after he had announced the federal capital would move by 1984 from Lagos to Abuja in the center of the country and that there would thenceforth be not 12 but 19 states, General Muhammed fell to an assassin's bullets. The consequences of tragically entwined internal army grievances and ambitions, the coup attempt and the slaying provoked instantaneous popular rage and grief all over the country.

The succession was smooth and swift. Obasanjo, Muhammed's chief of staff, a kind of prime minister in his government, quietly took over. The regime was known for some time as the Muhammed-Obasanjo government. The captured assassin and implicated plotters—almost all from the minorities and from the Middle Belt area of the old North—were quickly court-martialed and many were executed. (One possible factor in this haste was the memory of what delay in dealing with the coup-makers of January 15, 1966 had wrought.)

It was a time of profound national nervousness, fear, and xenophobia, though the outpouring of popular support for Obasanjo and his continuing government was massive. Nigeria was

sharing another historical trauma with the United States: assassination of a head of state. Yet what is called tragedy in a Western country is often called instability in a developing one. In this case Nigeria showed it was stable, and it also reinforced a widely held belief with profound political implications: that a military coup could succeed with popular support (as in July 1975), but must fail without it.

The government continued the program Muhammed had laid out, addressing also the economic and other questions vital to the country's development. With a gross domestic product of over $30 billion, a population of 80 million, and vociferous demands and criticisms from the public, there was much to do. Education was a priority, whether in implementing universal primary education or increasing the number of universities to 13. Another was revising the "indigenization" policy, first set forth in 1972, to give Nigerians control over "the commanding heights of the economy" and participation in all its aspects. Under the Obasanjo version, announced early in 1977, Nigerians (in the public or private sector) would own 40, 60 or 100 percent of various categories of business. While foreign companies feared "nationalization," it was, Nigerians argued, the very opposite: in the 40 and 60 percent categories, their presence would insure against government takeover. Few foreign firms left, and those that stayed showed few signs of distress as years passed.

Later came low-cost housing programs and what was called the Land Use Decree, an important measure which sought both to standardize the basis on which land could be bought and sold in the southern states (it had long been under regional or state government control in the northern states) and to encourage the development of undeveloped land.

There was an urgent need to reduce the size of the army. From 10,000 in 1966 it had grown to 250,000 during the civil war. Demobilization was particularly difficult in an economy with urban unemployment. It was one of the issues the Gowon government had not faced. The Muhammed regime had tackled it early, and the reaction to its plans, real and rumored, had contributed to the attempted coup of February 13. Nonetheless,

the army had to be dealt with; its size was good neither for a future civilian government nor for the army itself: it lacked efficiency and new blood. In the end, military leaders reduced the army from about 230,000 in 1976 to under 150,000 at the handover.

The talk among civilians focused on the political program, on schedule despite Muhammed's assassination. The Constitution Drafting Committee submitted its 104-page draft in September 1976, and loud public debate on it began instantly. The CDC had indeed recommended a new style of democracy, and much of the draft had a decidedly American flavor: an executive president and a vice-president; a two-house federal legislature; separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers; guarantees of fundamental rights; state governors and legislatures. Among the many distinctively Nigerian features, the most important were the guarantees against sectionalism and against combining blocs of voters on the basis of ethnicity for the purpose of excluding certain groups. The president and vice-president had to come from different parts of the country, and the principle of "reflecting the federal character"—that is, choosing people from all states—was enshrined everywhere: in appointments to the Cabinet, to governmental commissions, to ambassadorships.

The members of the CDC had faithfully followed the charge of General Muhammed and had agreed on dangers to be avoided. They failed only to restrict the number of states that could be further created—though they did draw up very complex provisions for creating them to prevent "every town, village, or clan from constituting itself into a state."

The next steps followed in turn, beginning with the reorganization of local government, which effectively immobilized the influence of the traditional political leaders (most obviously the emirs in the far northern states) on candidates and elections.

The first elections Nigeria had seen in more than a decade came in December 1976 when new local government councils were chosen. Elections to the Constituent Assembly followed the next August. The assembly, which convened in October and had a year to complete its work on the draft, had 232 members, 203

elected, some directly and some indirectly. They were former political figures, lawyers, university teachers, businessmen, and a few diplomats and journalists. The government appointed 20 more to look out for interests which, in their view, were underrepresented: women, labor, commerce and industry, the press, educators, students, public servants, and traditional authorities. Two of them were the chairman and his deputy, both judges but from different parts of the country. And they added nine committee chairmen from the drafting committee's subcommittees.

In August 1978 the Constituent Assembly sent its draft to the Supreme Military Council, and waited until September 21, when General Obasanjo lifted the ban on politics. It was the starting shot—but a large number of political horses had left the gate already. Most prominent was Chief Awolowo, who not only had a party organization but could declare himself almost immediately its presidential candidate. He was able to contest only because the Supreme Military Council had amended the draft constitution to allow his candidacy, changing from October 1, 1960 to January 15, 1966 the date after which conviction for "corruption, unjust enrichment, or abuse of office" would disqualify a candidate. Awolowo called his party the United Party of Nigeria (UPN)—the Constitution prohibited the use of any word connoting section, religion, or ethnic group, or using the symbols of former parties.

Others had been organizing as well, inside and outside the Constituent Assembly, including old political figures and what came to be called the "new breed," men in their 30s and early 40s aspiring to leadership.

Five-Party Contest

By December 1978 no fewer than 52 political associations had applied to the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) to be registered as parties and field candidates for election! In the end, only five met the conditions for being truly national laid down in the Electoral Decree that guided FEDECO, set up to arbitrate complex electoral issues and administer the entire political and electoral process. This body, whose 23 commission-

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ers included one from each state, had procedural and logistical responsibility for everything from voter registration through announcing the final results. By law it was independent of everyone, including the courts and the Supreme Military Council itself.

The leaders of the four other political parties, like Awolowo, were known to Nigerians from the politics of the First Republic. Foremost among them, though he had said he would stay out of politics and remain an "elder statesman," was Azikiwe, now 74

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years old (Awolowo was 70), who led the new National People's party (NPP).

The three other parties all had presidential candidates from northern states. Waziri Ibrahim, a Kanuri from Borno and a very successful businessman, had been a young NPC minister in the First Republic. He had not entered the Constituent Assembly himself, but had organized many in and outside it to form the original NPP, from which his new party, the Great Nigeria People's party (GNPP), had split.

Another was a towering figure of earlier politics and a member of the Constituent Assembly from Kano, Aminu Kano. Always a maverick and a populist, always in opposition to the northern "establishment," he was a man of simple life-style and deeply held convictions and was respected throughout the country. His party was called the People's Redemption party (PRP).

The last to become a certain candidate was the man who would ultimately be president, Shagari. Always described as "modest and unassuming," he had been a young NPC minister during the First Republic and had later succeeded Awolowo as commissioner for finance under Gowon. Respected as a man of integrity and a fine administrator, known to some for his keen interest in education and for his poetry in Hausa, he was a Fulani from Sokoto, like that giant of First Republic politics, the Sardauna.

He and other "heavyweights" of the old politics had come together during the Constituent Assembly to form the nucleus of what would become the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The most diverse in outlook and geography, and by consensus the richest, the NPN had many potential candidates for president. It was by no means certain that Shagari—believed by many to be a reluctant candidate—would emerge leading the ticket. When he did, it was only after a hard-fought six-way race that took place in a turbulent convention, closed to the public.

When the presidential candidates of the five parties chose their running mates, all but the NPP had an Ibo in the second slot; in the NPP's case, Zik's presidential candidacy made the most eloquent possible statement about reconciliation and the fullest Ibo role in Nigeria's polity. An America that elected no President

from the South for a century after its Civil War could particularly admire the message.

On the Hustings

After January 1979, campaigning began countrywide, in a manner reminiscent of pre-television political races in the United States but new to Nigeria. The national candidates traversed the country, up and down, to and fro, touching all states and rural areas within those states. That was important not only for the voters but for the leaders who were learning more about their country than they had ever needed to know in the days of single-member parliamentary constituencies.

These were not the smooth-running, perfectly orchestrated appearances Americans have lately become used to. Neither the political machinery nor the communications could make that possible. There was almost always delay and a certain pandemonium in campaign trips, but people seemed to take it in good humor, even with enthusiasm: it was, after all, democracy.

The scrambling was not just on the campaign trail. Much had to be done in a very short time. Imperative was finding candidates, qualified candidates for that matter, who could pass FEDECO's scrutiny. There were nearly 2,000 elective offices: 449 members of the House of Representatives; 95 Senators; 19 state governors and their deputies; 1,347 members of State Assemblies. Had five parties fielded candidates for all, that would have meant some 10,000 Nigerians running for office; it so happened that only the NPN could find candidates for almost all slots.

In all this there was excitement, but also suspense, and not a little tension. Literally everything had to be done from the beginning, and an American observing all this found just how much we take for granted.

Only on April 1, 1979 did the head of state announce, not the dates of the elections, but the period during which they would take place. The precise dates came later: four successive Saturdays, starting on July 7; then, after a week's break, on August 11 the presidential election.

What no one knew as July approached was what the electorate would do. Those who had voted before had done so nationally only a long 15 years before. Women in the old North had never voted, and of course the newly enfranchised 18-year-olds (and others much older) had not either. Had the military, with all their efforts from the initial creation of states on, succeeded in ending regional and ethnic politics?

The logistics of the elections, especially in the heavy rains, were all but insuperable. There were over 90,000 polling stations, some of them accessible only by boat or helicopter. They not only had to have ballots for each election, but had to be manned by accredited officials, who would ensure proper procedures and the safety of the ballots as they were taken for counting to central locations.

Results were, inevitably, slow in coming, and far from getting sympathy, FEDECO was accused from all sides, as everyone claimed rigging and other dark deeds. Said one of its officials during the ordeal, "The fact that each says all the others rigged must raise some question about the charges." If the charges were familiar, what was strikingly different from the elections of the 1960s was that there was no violence.

When the results of the first election, to the Senate, were announced, a pattern emerged: UPN, Awolowo's party, overwhelmingly carried the five states that made up the former Western Region. Four of those five states were predominantly Yoruba, and the only state in which Awolowo came in second had a large Yoruba population. Zik's party, NPP, won almost as overwhelmingly in the two Ibo states, but it also got more than half of the vote in Plateau, a state in the former Middle Belt region of the north. PRP won in Kano and did very well in Kaduna; GNPP won in Borno, did very well in Gongola, and came in second in a number of other states, notably Sokoto. It was the NPN, however, that clearly had the greatest and the widest support, with the largest number of votes in eight states, and the second-largest in ten others, coming in third only in Lagos.

What seemed a recurrence of "tribal" voting distressed many Nigerians. It was most striking among the Yoruba, who voted

80-90 percent UPN. They seemed, ironically, some thought, to have found ethnic solidarity for the first time just when a national outlook was to be the new order. It was scarcely less evident among the Ibo. But in other parts of the country, voting patterns were less monolithic, especially in the states of the former Northern Region, perhaps because Awolowo's and Azikiwe's counterpart there was dead. There were, of course, three northern candidates for president, and people did support their own. But states with no favorite son voted for the NPN.

Tension Builds

The pattern continued through four elections, but the figures heightened suspense over the presidency. One of the Constitution's particularly Nigerian provisions was that, to be elected president, a candidate must receive "one quarter of the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of all the states in the federation." It seemed certain that Shagari would win a quarter in 12 states, but what of the 13th?

The failure of any candidate to get the quarter of two-thirds would mean a vote in the electoral college, comprising all the newly elected legislators, who would choose between the candidate with the most votes and the one with the next-widest geographical spread. Everyone assumed that would mean Shagari vs. Awolowo, and since votes in the electoral college were not tied to the popular vote, who knew which one would emerge as president?

Tension grew as Nigerians awaited the presidential results. They learned that Shagari had the largest number of votes cast (by some 772,000), and over a quarter in 12 states, but that, in Kano State, the 13th, he had received only 20 percent. FEDECO, however, announced that, since two-thirds of nineteen was not thirteen but twelve and two-thirds, and since Shagari's Kano total was a quarter of two-thirds of the votes cast there, Shagari was elected President. "Either way, someone would have gone to court," said a high FEDECO official, and he was undoubtedly right.

Awolowo, of course, did just that, as the Nigerian public

argued the merits of the case loudly and emotionally. It was not until September 26, five days before the handover, that the Supreme Court rejected Awolowo's appeal of an Election Tribunal decision in FEDECO's favor. The way was clear for October 1. As a farewell gift to the nation, the Supreme Military Council, at its last meeting on September 28, abolished the electoral college in favor of a second popular election should the two-thirds requirement raise complications in the future.

The Military Step Down

And so on that rainy October 1 morning, General Obasanjo formally handed over the leadership of Nigeria to Shagari. The symbolism that worked so well for Westerners, as the sun burst through the clouds, worked better still for Nigerians: for them, rain washes away evil. Tafawa Balewa Square, which those unwilling to acknowledge Shagari's victory had said would be only half-filled, had no empty seat, and the crowds rejoiced, even in that UPN stronghold of Lagos. As the last of the formal ceremonies ended, an Air Force helicopter hovered overhead. From it flapped a flag-like white cloth, and on it the words, "Welcome Second Republic; Bye-Bye FMG" (Federal Military Government).

The FMG—General Obasanjo and his colleagues—had done what they set out to do. Young men all (Obasanjo, himself 42, was the oldest), they had walked away from power, without transforming themselves into their own civilian successors, or choosing those who would follow them. They had seen democracy restored and, they hoped, entrenched; they had seen to it that, as far as possible, democratic or at least representative means were used to bring about that democracy.

Although Nigeria had had a military government, it had not had military dictatorship. The government had not kept political prisoners or banned publications (though it did sometimes suspend them for a day or two). Thirteen daily newspapers were often highly critical of specific actions or inaction. The military had not excluded civilians from government; on the contrary, especially in the civil service, civilians were at times more

influential than the military. But the ruling military knew their Nigeria: they could not be as genuinely responsive to public opinion as democratically elected representatives could be, and ultimately Nigerians would demand that responsiveness, however many conflicting views would need reconciling, and however slowly government might work in consequence.

The military had taken some steps that civilians could not take to strengthen the country's unity and stability for the future. They had created states, and then more states. They had strengthened the federation at the center, but at the same time, through local government reforms, brought the most immediate local decisions closer to the people. They had also built networks of roads. They had extended education, and provided for a kind of "affirmative action" policy to compensate for historical disadvantages of various types (and had met with precisely the range of reactions the same policy has faced in the United States). They had moved the site of the federal capital to near the center of the country, symbolically of immense importance.

They had wanted to fix federal revenue allocation constitutionally, but the Constituent Assembly had deferred the decision. They had wanted to stop the creation of more states, but civilians would not accept that. They had not touched the inflammatory question of the census; but they did start implementing indirect ways of counting people.

They did not solve the problem of corruption. They did, however, leave the new democracy as strong economically as they could. They could not quickly dispose of inflation or the bureaucratic tangles that interfered at every level of every project. They could not speed up too-slow growth in the industrial sector, or, most important of all, rapidly reverse the decline in agricultural productivity, so precipitous in the previous decade that Nigeria became a food importer on a vast scale. But they could, and they did, take important steps after the oil glut of 1977–78 reduced world demand for petroleum exports, on which Nigeria was far too dependent. Through austerity budgets—introduced in spite of the revived oil market (a result, in part, of events in Iran in 1979)—they doubled their foreign exchange reserves from the

end of 1978 to the end of 1979. General Obasanjo has since made it clear that austerity was aimed at strengthening the stability of the new government, and providing a cushion if another oil glut came—as it did in 1981.

The military had inadvertently done one other important thing: they had given Nigeria successively a head of state from each of the three majority ethnic groups (Ibo, Hausa and Yoruba) and one from a minority group in the old North. They could hope that, in seeing the nation survive and grow in cohesion, Nigerians would feel secure enough one day to think less about where the president came from than about the person and leader he was.

A Time of Testing

The kind of person the new president was quickly became clear. He was quiet and unassuming, but also an articulate and at times forceful public speaker, who, especially in exchanges with the press, let his dry wit come through; a man whose style would not be theatrical and whose actions would be thoughtful and deliberate. "I don't believe in rash actions," Shagari said a week before his inauguration. "I take my time whatever I'm doing, and I must be sure of myself. In 1975 the regime did everything in a flash, made a great impression—and then found they had made some mistakes. I am not going to do that. I am not a military man. I will endeavor to do what I've promised within my term of office. I don't want you to expect miracles from October."

Yet many Nigerians who had studied both their country and the new form of government less closely than Shagari *did* expect miracles. Even where the pattern of transition is well-established, in the United States, Americans know it takes time for a new administration to settle in. The conventional "honeymoon" makes allowance for it.

Nigerians did not realize how much would have to be done. They talked, of course, of on-the-job training, but even those who knew America, even Americans in Nigeria, did not know just how much learning there would have to be. And the process was more complicated than for a new U.S. administration. First had

to come un-learning, for Nigerians' experience had been with the parliamentary system.

The new system was not only different but complex. The executive and legislative branches functioned differently from the parliamentary model, and the judicial role was new, as the Supreme Court's review of the twelve-and-two-thirds issue had shown. The role of the civil service was different: an entirely new relationship had to come into being between top civil servants and the Cabinet appointees. There the change was especially profound, since, under military rule, senior civil servants had been far more deeply involved in policy-making than the civilian Constitution allowed.

Tensions of a creative kind were built into the new Constitution. General Obasanjo commented soon after the handover that he saw ahead a period of "testing for height": legislature versus executive; House versus Senate; states versus center—all would be seeking to define the extent of their authority and power, and all would want to push those limits as far as possible. Tensions were present in another arena: political parties versus elected officials. Again the parliamentary legacy complicated the solution.

Nor was there a honeymoon for Shagari's government. Not everyone placed the highest priority on the smooth functioning of the system, and the fact that there were five parties, and none with a legislative majority in the Senate or the House of Representatives, threw a further challenge to those trying to put the machinery of government in place.

Shagari, needing votes in the Senate to have his Cabinet appointees (at least one from each of the 19 states) confirmed so that the executive branch could function, invited the parties to join him in a working accord. Those that agreed would obviously be offered Cabinet and other appointments. In the end, Azikiwe's party, the NPP, agreed to join, receiving posts in the Cabinet and elsewhere, and the Cabinet appointees were confirmed.

Parliamentary thinking on the part of legislators, some members of the executive, and certainly the leadership of political parties (as opposed to elected officials) proved recalcitrant. And

yet, as one sat in the gallery looking down on the proceedings of the Senate or the House, one had to think, how could it be otherwise? The shapes of the chambers inherited from the First Republic were rectangular, for instance, House-of-Commons style. They were in the Westminster model: government and opposition benches facing each other across a carpet. The rubbles that initially governed debate were inherited parliamentary ones.

Nonetheless, it was in the federal legislature especially that learning took place most rapidly, and it was there that the new system came to be best understood. Senators and members of the House lived near each other, talking of issues as well as political alignments and tactics in off hours. Some were developing a new sense of obligation to their constituents and to the nation, and an understanding of the need to treat issues on their merits. It was among the legislators, then, that the shedding of parliamentary thinking was most striking. Because of this, much of the press, Nigerian and foreign, saw impending doom, and wrote of "disintegrating governing coalitions," as NPP legislators did not vote on issues with NPN.

What they should have seen was that some individual legislators were voting their conscience and their constituents' interests, and that executive-branch lobbying was beginning to work, too. When the NPN-NPP "cooperation" came to a formal end in July 1981, it simply meant that the President and his men would have to work harder than they would have had there been a disciplined parliamentary alliance. American presidents know the challenge well.

Under Shagari's purposely quiet and calm leadership, Nigeria's Second Republic has weathered one challenge after another during its first two years. In each instance, the circumstances were investigated by a tribunal or, more significant for the working of the new system, in the case of constitutional questions, they were taken to court.

Indeed, the new role of the judiciary—and its exercise of that role—marks one of Nigeria's greatest achievements. Like Americans, Nigerians are eager to litigate; moreover, most abide by the

courts' decisions. As General Obasanjo commented recently as he looked back on the Supreme Court's decision on the presidential election, "We could not have done anything more important if we had planned it. However the case turned out, it established the principle of testing the Constitution's provisions in court as nothing else could have done."

Despite the "growing pains" much discussed—and certainly expected—Nigerians have adjusted to their new democracy. Those who did not expect the army to give way to democracy were wrong, and so were those who said the "experiment" would last only three months, or six months. A critical time will surely come with the elections in 1983, but two years after the handover, Nigerians do not talk of "experiment," nor do they foresee serious political threats to their continuing democracy. All now acknowledge the legitimacy of the president and the government; respect for Shagari himself is widespread; and, though the testing for height continues, the on-the-job training has produced both machinery that works more smoothly as time passes and people committed to its working.

Economic Hurdles

The dangers the Second Republic faces are primarily economic. With 80 percent of its revenues and 90 percent of its foreign exchange derived from petroleum, Nigeria is as much subject to the vagaries of the world oil market as is the American consumer—but inversely. While the "oil glut" of 1981 was quite satisfying to Americans, who faced no long lines at gas stations, for Nigerians, with their revenues from oil nearly halved, it was serious. Unlike such oil producers as Libya, the United Arab Emirates or even Saudi Arabia, whose means far outstrip the demands of their populations, Nigeria has possibly 90 million people with late-20th-century expectations for the development of their country.

They have accepted as if it were a matter of course an ambitious five-year development plan which will cost $141 billion between January 1981 and December 1985. The plan's highest priorities are agriculture; such public-sector industries

critical to further development as iron and steel, and liquefied natural gas; education, housing and health. The plan includes commitments to move the capital to the new site, Abuja, where building is already under way; to maintain existing capital assets and improve infrastructure; and to train much needed manpower. The larger goal is to diversify the economy to reduce its too-great dependence on oil exports.

Public expectations are high, both from the plan and from the precedent that loosening import restrictions has set; Nigerians demand of their new government, as they have of their previous ones, that it fulfill these expectations. Like the American public, Nigerians do not always understand the subtleties of economic forces beyond a government's control; instead they blame the government in power.

But might they blame not only the government but the new institutions as well? Given the belief that the army can intervene successfully only amid widespread popular discontent, this has to be a concern. Though no serious rumor of such a possibility has surfaced two years into the Second Republic, students of 20th-century Europe know that nothing undermines democracy like economic crisis.

Fortunately for Nigeria, foreign exchange reserves have been adequate to provide a cushion. In addition, the 1981 price of oil is more than double that during the 1977–78 glut; thus the drop in revenue had a greater impact on future expectations than it did on the ability to meet present commitments. Commented one legislator, "It may be as we always say: 'Every disappointment a blessing.' It is making people face economic reality here as in the rest of the world." The Shagari government took stern austerity measures, and most agreed that a true sense of austerity could only help the Second Republic.

Further, Nigeria's price discount in September 1981 was a step toward increasing the production of crude oil, which had plummeted to a low of under 700,000 barrels a day by August, after starting the year at over 2 million. The further drop in price, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) price unification and Saudi Arabia's cut in production

that followed in late October brought output to 1.8 million barrels a day by December.

In any event, oil gluts come and go, often depending on unpredictable circumstances. If events in 1978 ended one glut and an Iran-Iraq war postponed another, who is to know what effect the next turn of Middle Eastern politics and policies might have on the oil market? The West in general, and the United States in particular, needs to be reminded that a stable Nigeria provided oil during the Arab oil boycott of 1974, and that, as few commentators have noticed, supply lines from West Africa are the most direct and can be the most reliable for the United States. It is thus almost as much in the interest of the United States as it is in Nigeria's own that the Second Republic continue and prosper, economically as well as politically.

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Nigeria and the United States

When newly independent Nigeria placed one of its five overseas missions in Washington—a clear sign that it wished to expand relations with the United States—the U.S. government had barely begun to discover Africa. Only in 1958 had the Senate established an Africa subcommittee of its Foreign Relations Committee, with John F. Kennedy as its first chairman. Twenty years later that relationship between the two countries had come a long way. Nigeria today is the United States' second largest supplier of crude oil, as it has been for some eight years. And because of oil, Nigeria is also America's second largest balance-of-payments creditor. But the prospects for the relationship remain uncertain.

In the early 1960s when the Congo was monopolizing American policy-makers' attention in Africa, President Kennedy nevertheless made time for African heads of state, seeing and talking substance with more of them than any President has done since. One of his visitors was Nigeria's prime minister. The communiqué at the end of their talks in July 1961 touched on two themes: the economic relationship between their countries,

and their shared concerns about African issues. Then as now these were the twin bases of relations, but the delineations have changed profoundly.

Nigeria, like most newly independent African countries, set great store in the United Nations. In the Congo, where the UN, with full American support, was a central actor, Nigerian statesmen contributed to the peaceful solution, and President Kennedy praised "the exemplary performance of Nigerian troops and police serving with the UN in the Congo." In their communiqué, the President and the prime minister "agreed that the Congo's political and economic problems must not be used for cold-war purposes." That marked the beginning of a continuity of agreement on a fundamental issue which was subsequently enlarged to include all of Africa.

On the economic side, the emphasis was on aid; there was only passing reference to increasing trade and investment. Nigeria by 1965 had the largest U.S. aid program in Africa and the largest Peace Corps program also, a measure of U.S. confidence in Nigeria's future.

The U.S. and Biafran Secession

Nigeria's foreign policy orientation, both political and economic, in the 1960s was toward Britain, and that suited most American policy-makers. In dealing with Africa, not just Nigeria, they took their cue from the colonial powers who were, after all, North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. The Nigerian civil war raised for the first time major policy questions with bilateral implications. By then the U.S. government had been dealing with an independent Nigeria for nearly seven years. But astonishingly, at the start of the war in July 1967, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that Nigeria was Britain's responsibility. Therefore, he continued, the United States would not supply arms to either side.

For American policy-makers, Biafra raised the specter not only of the American Civil War but also of the attempted secession of Katanga from the Congo and the prospect of an ever-fragmenting, unstable Africa that would be an easy prey for

Soviet "adventurism." The OAU, established in 1963 to promote the unity and solidarity of African states, had not yet made the inviolability of inherited colonial boundaries quite the credo it has since become, but the sentiment was there, and Africans themselves talked about the dangers of "Balkanization."

Some advisers in Washington urged support of the "One Nigeria" of Gowon's government but were overruled. And in August 1967, the Nigerian government, having tried to buy arms from the United States and having been refused, announced an agreement to purchase them from the Soviet Union. *The New York Times* editorialized about the American reaction this way: ". . . unusually clumsy tactics have spotlighted the schizophrenia in Washington's behavior . . . Washington hopes the attempt of Ibo leaders of the East to set up a separate state of 'Biafra' will not succeed. Yet Washington goes out of its way to publicize its refusal 'to provide arms and ammunition to either side.' And when the Soviet Union moves into the vacuum . . . the State Department promptly calls this 'a matter of regret.' "

The "schizophrenia" was to persist throughout the war. The United States maintained its position, which it sometimes described as neutrality and in the process infuriated both sides.

With Republican presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon and Democratic hopeful Eugene McCarthy insisting in 1968 that genocide was taking place in Biafra, pressure to shift support to Biafra on humanitarian grounds became ever more intense. But the American government did not yield; and President Nixon, faced with Nigeria's realities, did not talk further of a genocide for which there was no evidence, though he did continue the humanitarian concern and appointed his own special coordinator for relief in 1969.

After the civil war, relations between the two countries were not particularly cordial. Nigeria felt the United States had betrayed it in its time of trial: America, which had fought its own civil war against secession, should have understood better than others Nigeria's needs and come to its aid. Not that Nigerians had expected a gift; Americans would have been paid for any military equipment they agreed to sell, just as the Russians and

the British had been. From Nigeria's point of view, the refusal was less comprehensible and more insulting on that account.

Americans outside the State Department lost interest as soon as the war ended. Indeed, they could not maintain an interest, for the U.S. press did not report the war's aftermath. In Lagos, relations with Americans were correct but cool. The Peace Corps, widely seen in Nigeria as having rallied American opinion to Biafra's side, had been phased out during the war. The Agency for International Development program was shrinking. Nigerians were preoccupied with rebuilding their country, while turning their attention to a more prominent role in Africa. It was the style of Gowon's government to do that very quietly.

The OAU, recognizing Nigeria's importance and as a tribute to its new stature, elected General Gowon its chairman in 1973. In that capacity he came to New York in early October to address the UN General Assembly. Nigeria was already a major oil supplier to the United States, and the visit of its head of state to the UN provided an excellent opportunity for a meeting with the American President. The State Department clearly understood the importance of a meeting, but appointments for Gowon and Nixon to meet were scheduled, canceled, rescheduled—all from Washington. Finally, the Nigerians said they had had enough, and their head of state left without seeing the President, who had rushed to Key Biscayne to deal with the mounting pressures of the Watergate investigation. The White House might have made time in the President's schedule had they known an oil boycott and an OPEC decision which would quadruple oil prices were imminent. (OPEC, the cartel of oil-producing nations which Nigeria joined in 1971, has coordinated petroleum policies.)

The economic relationship between the United States and Nigeria had already changed fundamentally, but the change went almost unnoticed. By 1972 Nigeria was the United States' third largest supplier of crude oil, and at the time of the Arab oil boycott after the Yom Kippur war in 1973, it was moving into second place, providing nearly 14 percent of U.S. imports. Nigeria decided not to join the boycott. That decision, made for a

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number of reasons, not least economic self-interest, helped the United States weather the crisis. Washington, however, never publicly acknowledged Nigeria's role. In fact, it chose that moment to end what had been Africa's largest aid program. Though Washington expected an angry reaction, Lagos greeted the news with amiable unconcern. What did distress Nigerians was Washington's continuing neglect of Nigeria's international priorities—notably decolonization and an end to apartheid in southern Africa.

Nigeria was moving toward a more active role in African affairs, though a far less visible and forceful one than it would assume after 1975. General Gowon would have no part of South Africa's wish for "dialogue" with the states of black Africa. He had reaffirmed Nigeria's commitment to the liberation movements, and had declared in 1971 that Portugal must free one of its colonies, Angola, Mozambique or Guinea Bissau, within two years. By 1975 U.S. economic stakes in Nigeria were as great as in South Africa—and growing faster. And, as the author testified before a Senate subcommittee that year, Americans (and Western Europeans) doing business with both South Africa and Nigeria might one day be asked by Nigeria's policy-makers to choose between the two.

At this same time—1974-75—Nigeria joined with Togo in promoting the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in which Nigeria's weight and leadership were critical. Since a fully functioning ECOWAS would consolidate and rationalize a market beyond Nigeria's own millions, it could provide the Western economies with a potentially sizable outlet for their exports. This was a new Nigeria, but it took the United States some time to recognize the fact.

The fact would become much harder to ignore with the government led by General Muhammed. Internally and internationally, both substance and style changed dramatically. This government, like Gowon's, recognized the importance of Nigerian-American relations; the other side of the oil coin, after all, was the ever-growing U.S. market for Nigeria's petroleum exports. In outlining their plans for economic development, the

new leaders stated their wish to diversify U.S. investment in Nigeria and to acquire American technology. Therefore, when the new 32-year-old foreign minister, then Colonel J. N. Garba, had his first discussions with the American secretary of state in September 1975, he suggested that Henry A. Kissinger ought to consider visiting Africa, which he had never done, saying that he would be welcome in Nigeria.

The Angola Letter

Kissinger agreed in principle, but soon thereafter U.S. policy decisions affecting Africa brought U.S.-Nigerian relations to their lowest point. Ironically those decisions gave the Muhammed government the issue that would thrust Nigeria into new prominence in Africa and the world. Nigeria, along with most OAU members, had hoped Angola would attain independence with a government of national unity, incorporating the country's three liberation movements. What abruptly changed Nigeria's position and prompted it to lead the OAU into recognizing the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was the movement of South African troops deep into Angola to ensure a government of the two rivals.

After Congress' passage in December 1975 of the Clark Amendment, sponsored by Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa), prohibiting further covert aid to the MPLA's opposition, President Gerald R. Ford sent a circular letter to key African heads of state to "persuade" them not to push for recognition of MPLA at the forthcoming OAU special summit meeting scheduled for January 1976. Nigeria saw this as inappropriate pressure, was deeply offended, and took the unprecedented step of publishing the letter with critical commentary, thus giving a major boost to MPLA's campaign for recognition.

Nigeria then as now saw South Africa as the foremost enemy of Africa and supported no government or movement in Africa allied with South Africa. It saw no merit in the argument that the threat in southern Africa was communism and that the important enemies were the Soviet Union and Cuba. Whenever the United States appears to insist that South Africa is more critical as a

defense against the advance of communism in Africa than as Africa's enemy, relations between the United States and Nigeria—and other African states as well—will be severely strained.

By the time Kissinger wanted to visit Lagos in April 1976, it was "not convenient" for him to come. In fact, it was more serious than diplomatic inconvenience, for following Muhammed's assassination, Nigerian xenophobia was directed toward both Britain and the United States. In June and again in September, Kissinger's requests to visit Nigeria were rebuffed.

Clark and Young

An important relationship, with its residue of substantial goodwill that had survived the late 1960s, was nearly destroyed. But the resilience of the relationship emerged after November 1976. Nigerians' first chance after Jimmy Carter's election to show their willingness to look for common interests came in early December, with Senator Clark's visit to Lagos. Clark, chairman of the Africa subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had raised the first objections to covert American assistance to the anti-MPLA forces in Angola, received a warm welcome. Nigerians perceived that the new Administration had people in it—or close to it—who saw Africa's problems first as African, whatever other perspectives they might have; people who placed a new emphasis on human rights, which was bound to affect the Administration's view of southern Africa.

In February 1977 came the meeting between U.S. Ambassador to the UN Andrew Young and General Obasanjo, which U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Donald B. Easum described as "the most momentous of my foreign service career. It was thrilling to see a strong, powerful leader with control of his country changing the whole relationship between it and the United States." What was new was communication, and as a result the two countries reached a consensus on points of mutual self-interest.

In regard to southern Africa, goals previously thought to be in conflict were seen to be similar. Keeping communism out of Africa was as much the aim of Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as it was of Ford and Kissinger, but they attempted

to do it in a way that meshed with the goals of Nigeria and other African states. The latter insisted that it meant finding truly democratic solutions for Rhodesia and Namibia—majority governments that would be profoundly nationalist but by no means Soviet allies, let alone Communist wedges into the continent. Nigerians, in short, did not want a Soviet sphere of influence in Africa any more than the United States did.

The Carter Administration sought Nigerian cooperation for neither symbolic nor sentimental value, as some detractors later suggested. By August 1977, when Nigeria was host to the UN Conference Against Apartheid, Americans understood that Nigeria was playing a new and important international role: a high-powered delegation represented the United States at that meeting in Lagos. (The 1981 meeting on the same subject in Paris saw no Reagan Administration presence at all.)

When Nigeria's head of state came to address the UN General Assembly in October 1977, he also made a full-dress state visit to Washington. Discussions between Carter and Obasanjo brought agreement to hold formal bilateral discussions on economic issues as well as issues relating to southern Africa. Both men were more comfortable with substance than form.

Further, Carter went to Lagos at the end of March 1978. It was the first state visit an American President had ever made in Africa (though President Franklin D. Roosevelt did drop by Liberia on his way home from Casablanca in 1943). Again the results were substantive, though the symbolism drew an irate reaction from South Africa's then prime minister Vorster. He denounced Carter's criticizing his country's exclusionary politics from the platform of what he called Nigeria's "military dictatorship with no freedom of the press." The description revealed only Vorster's own ignorance. The visit moved cooperation with Nigeria into high gear. With Vance's concurrence, the Nigerians decided to call a meeting in Lagos, while Carter was there, of the foreign ministers of the front-line states, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Botswana and Mozambique, to address Rhodesian issues.

Efforts to find peaceful ways to assure and implement demo-

cratic government, Western-style, for Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Namibia (South-West Africa) from 1977 on involved, on the African side, the front-line states *and* Nigeria. On the Western side the "contact group" consisted of the United States, Britain, Canada, France and West Germany. Working with Nigeria would not have been possible, or even imagined, in 1976. It was, indeed, unthinkable during the Nixon-Ford years to have foreign ministers and other high officials from the two countries on a first-name, protocol-free basis; that was the outward sign of the new communication which resulted in coordinated efforts based on mutual good faith if not always a coincidence of views.

Nigeria's new sense of confidence extended beyond southern Africa as Garba sought solutions to other crises in rounds of shuttle diplomacy equal in pace if not publicity to those of Kissinger in the Nixon and Ford Administrations. To give only one example, in 1977 when Zaire's Shaba (formerly Katanga) province was invaded, Nigeria played an important mediating role between Angola and Zaire, having first, however, ascertained that the United States would not intervene militarily ("nonlethal" military equipment apart) on Zaire's behalf. Obasanjo and Garba insisted that this African problem must have an African solution. From the American side, Nigeria's initiative (which the United States did not, indeed could not, have engineered) provided a way to resist pressure to intervene.

Improved communication and coincidence of some interests did not mean, however, that either country could take the other for granted. Jealously guarding the independence of its policy as well as its identity, Nigeria differed profoundly at times with the United States, as with Britain or France or the Soviet Union. In July 1978 at the OAU summit meeting at Khartoum, Sudan, General Obasanjo spoke of foreign intervention in Africa in forceful terms, terms that remain the basis of Nigeria's policy.

> To the Soviets and their friends, I should like to say that having been invited to Africa in order to assist in the liberation struggle and the consolidation of national independence, they should not overstay their welcome. Africa is not about to throw off one colonial yoke for another.

> To the Western powers, I say that they should act in such a way that we are not led to believe they have different concepts of independence and sovereignty for Africa and for Europe. . . . Paratroop drops in the 20th century [by France in Zaire] are no more acceptable to us than the gunboats of the last century were to our ancestors. Convening conferences in Europe and America to decide the fate of Africa raises too many ugly specters which should be best forgotten both in our and the European interests. . . .

He was speaking of the French-orchestrated intervention on behalf of Zaire and the associated sudden American shift to the rhetoric of big-power chess. Nigeria's leaders were no longer confident of their understanding of American policy, and by August 1978 members of the Supreme Military Council were characterizing government-to-government relations as merely "correct." Stalled efforts in southern Africa, especially over Rhodesia, moderated the earlier cautious optimism, and soon General Obasanjo pronounced the Anglo-American plan "dead."

Though the pace of agreed-upon efforts slowed and their number diminished, the United States and Nigeria one more time played critical, if not coordinated, roles with profound effects on the future Zimbabwe. Carter resisted mounting congressional pressure in May and June 1979 to lift sanctions against Rhodesia and recognize the so-called internal settlement, which excluded the armed and exiled Patriotic Front. Nigerians publicly applauded his firmness. For its part, Nigeria sent on August 1 the strongest possible message to Britain's new Conservative government about the economic cost to Britain of supporting the internal settlement: Nigeria nationalized British Petroleum (with compensation to be paid) and took other unpublicized but persuasive steps against British economic interests in Nigeria.

U.S. Economic Interests

The other crucial interest Nigeria and the United States shared was economic, and this aspect of the relationship moved ahead quietly. For the most part, the Nigerian government was as eager for expanded economic ties as the American Administra-

tion, concerned about the growing balance-of-payments deficit. Nigeria wished to increase the American role, partly to diversify the external economic presence further, and partly because of genuine admiration for American technology, whose transfer was one of their goals. Both governments were, indeed, rather more eager than the American private sector. The reasons were several. Some lay in the lack of adventurousness and African experience of potential U.S. investors.

Some Americans who were eager to export all manner of equipment and consumer goods to Nigeria were surprised to learn that what Nigerians wanted was investment in those sectors singled out in their development plan. Other Americans complained of the real difficulties of doing business in Nigeria—of bureaucratic tangles, and delays, and worse. They did not much like Nigeria's indigenization program, started in 1972 and revised in Nigeria's favor in 1977. Indigenization was designed to give the country control of "the commanding heights of the economy" and to give individual Nigerians a larger stake in their economic growth. It was not a program of nationalization, but it made Americans reluctant and nervous. (Britons, French, Germans, Italians, Japanese and others seemed to understand it better and, in any case, to mind it less.)

After 1978 the American government concentrated particularly on the economic side of the relationship, for Nigeria was entering the critical final stages of the transition to civilian rule. The American embassy had recognized Nigerian sensitivities to even the appearance of external interference in the process, and chose to distance its people from political events.

The Nigerian government's demand that American companies disclose their South African interests was thwarted by U.S. boycott legislation. Though designed for the Middle East, the legislation caught Nigeria in its net. The Nigerian government, perhaps because of the legal tangle, did not often press the issue. In any case, the expansion of the economic relationship between the two countries continued.

Indeed, after October 1, 1979, when democracy was restored under an American-style constitution, there were more reasons

than ever why relations between the two countries should be excellent. Although Nigerians did not choose that constitution because it was American, the fact that they chose it and then had to operate it predisposed them, especially their leadership in both executive and legislative branches, to be particularly interested in the United States and how it works—and to travel here. In 1980 20,000 Nigerians were studying in this country, a larger number than any other group of foreign students except Iranians. In consequence, Nigerians have come to understand more about the United States, including both possibilities and constraints on policy, than do many others.

Troubled Relations

That does not mean that the United States can take Nigeria for granted, as Carter found out when he dispatched Mohammed Ali to "persuade" African countries to boycott the Moscow Olympic Games of 1980 to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nigerians had denounced the invasion and might well have joined the Olympic boycott, but resented the crude pressure that Ali's visit represented. "We thought that sort of thing had gone out with Ford," raged a Nigerian legislator, referring to the 1975 letter on Angola. Ali's trip was only an irritation, however, which all but vanished as economic cooperation grew and the two countries shared the rejoicing over the independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980.

But the political and international dimensions of the relationship are in potential jeopardy now. The cause is the Reagan Administration's determination to return yet again to an East-West view of Africa's (and other world) problems. Nigeria, like most African countries, does not accept that view. Though the Shagari administration continues its predecessor's wish to have all external forces keep out of Africa's conflicts, a view they expect the United States to find congenial, they refuse to accept an American position that subordinates all other considerations to geopolitical and strategic ones as defined by the U.S. Administration. That position leads inexorably, Nigerians think, to America's giving the highest priority to the eradication of any

Cuban and Soviet presence and consequently supporting, implicitly or even explicitly, the South African government, whose apartheid is anathema to Nigeria.

The result is a serious divergence on southern African issues. Nigerian leaders are not asking the U.S. government to ignore a continuing Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola or to agree to a greater one in the southern African region, but they argue that it is not by "constructive engagement" with South Africa that one strengthens resistance to Communist-bloc penetration there—quite the contrary. By not criticizing South Africa's policies—its military supplying of the guerrilla forces of Jonas Savimbi and its bold invasion of Angola in September 1981 which resulted, by South Africa's own admission, in the killing of more than 200 Angolans—the United States defeats its own ends. In the case of Angola, the South African assault forced the MPLA to call for reinforcements from Cuba and the Soviet Union. Nigerian leaders point out that in refusing to condemn such South African military action the United States stands alone, not only against African and other third-world nations, but against its own European and Canadian allies. They see South Africa becoming, with moral support from the United States, bolder in its efforts to destabilize its neighbors, whether militarily as in Mozambique, or economically, as in Zimbabwe. They ask Americans to consider where those governments will be forced to turn for aid to defend themselves. Can the prospect of an actual increase in the Soviet presence possibly be in America's national interest?

Nigeria's leaders deplore the fact that, as a consequence of U.S. policy in southern Africa, African states struggling for political stability and economic growth may be forced to divert scarce resources into larger military expenditures. And they are baffled by a U.S. policy toward developing countries that seeks to shift the focus to arms sales while drastically cutting contributions to the World Bank. As a country that has welcomed the technical expertise American private industry can provide, Nigeria knows that private investment will only enter certain sectors: it may build a car assembly plant, but it will not build rural clinics. Further, Nigeria's less economically fortunate

President Alhaji Shehu Shagari, in an address in New York in October 1980, warned that Nigeria would use "any means at our disposal, including oil if necessary," to persuade friends to oppose apartheid.

neighbors cannot attract private-sector investment at all. And certainly private-sector energies do not solve such critical problems as food security in all African countries. If Africa's agriculture is woefully inadequate, at least some of that deficiency is the result of disastrous droughts during the 1970s. Will the United States simply dismiss the problem? The Nigerians' cool reaction to President Ronald Reagan's tenacious commitment at the North-South summit in Cancún, Mexico, in October 1981 to solely private-sector efforts, tempered only by some willingness to *begin* to move to *possible* global talks, should not have surprised Americans. As a country where private-sector efforts have long been welcomed, and where they work better than in many developing countries, Nigeria sees clearly that the third world is far from homogeneous. As one of the few countries that could probably benefit from the private initiative the Reagan policy may stimulate, Nigeria still believes its long-range security and economic interests reach beyond narrowly defined self-interest.

Americans unreceptive to Nigeria's position on these and, especially, southern African issues, have tended to ask—as they do of third-world countries generally—what can Nigerians do about it anyway? Such Americans raise the question of the "oil weapon," and dismiss it, noting that the "oil glut" makes its use impossible. In the first place, past oil gluts have not proved permanent. Secondly, Nigeria is not likely, under any conditions, simply to stop all oil exports to the United States, any more than it did during the Arab oil boycott. The revenue from oil is crucial to the Nigerian goal of diversifying and strengthening the economy.

But economic relationships are rarely "either/or": it is not just selling oil as usual or not selling it at all. The fact that those sales continue has created a large imbalance of trade in Nigeria's favor, with Nigeria nearly tied with Japan for America's largest balance-of-payments creditor in 1980. Even with diminished oil sales in 1981, Nigeria remains the second largest supplier; Nigerian imports from the United States would have to increase many fold to bring a balance. Though Nigerians have, especially since 1976, favored an increased American role in the industrial and agricultural sectors of their economy, Americans now interested could find doors that had been opening wider starting to close again. Nigerians know that businessmen from Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, and even Korea, all active in Nigeria already and keenly competitive, would eagerly take up whatever slack might be created by a cooler attitude toward American business—and exports.

Cooperation in Agriculture

Nigerians are in many respects favorably disposed toward the United States and many of its historical achievements. No Nigerian government, and certainly not the present one, wants a less fruitful relationship than the one developed in recent years—including six sets of bilateral economic talks since 1978, two at the vice-presidential level.

Probably the most important and vibrant result of Vice President Walter F. Mondale's visit to Lagos in July 1980 was

the creation of the Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (JACC), which includes Nigerians and Americans from both government and the private sector. Meeting regularly since then, in each country in turn, the JACC has not only opened communication at an impressive level of frankness and specificity; it has led to concrete joint ventures aimed at that sector of Nigeria's economy acknowledged to be in dire straits, and the one to which President Shagari and his government had already assigned the highest priority.

Many in Washington believe that shared economic interests and the genuine enthusiasm JACC has aroused in participants from both sides can overcome any setback in other aspects of relations, apparently minimizing Nigeria's near-cancellation of Vice President Alex Ekwueme's official visit to Washington in September 1981 in the wake of America's lone veto of a Security Council resolution condemning South Africa's invasion of Angola. That the Nigerians decided instead to come and demand a fuller explanation than the official one shows willingness to search for solutions. So does the attitude they share with the front-line states toward the Contact Group's effort to secure the internationally acceptable independence for Namibia, which the United States promises will result from the Reagan Administration's policy of constructive engagement with South Africa. It is an attitude of accommodating for a time an unpalatable approach in the hope that the approach may succeed.

The Stakes

But the time is not limitless. For the Nigerian public since 1975 has become keenly aware of southern African issues, making personal contributions of over $20 million to a fund to fight apartheid. In Nigeria, as in America, public opinion is particularly vocal. Thus no Nigerian president could sit by and watch the United States and Western Europe allow South Africa to handle—or not to handle—Namibia's future in total disregard of five years of painstaking negotiations, which produced procedures accepted by the world community, including the United States and its allies.

A lot is at stake. Apart from an obviously important bilateral economic relationship, American policy-makers might consider the following points: Nigeria is a democracy. Few in Nigeria proclaim socialist goals and, most Nigerians believe, the country does not have on its political spectrum any group, even quasi-political, whose avowed socialism goes beyond rhetoric. Nigeria has shown little inclination to support Soviet-bloc policies, let alone their penetration of Africa. From its sales of military equipment during Nigeria's civil war (which came only after the United States had refused the request), the Soviet Union has gotten little, if anything. Relations are correct, but there have certainly been no military inroads, nor support on international issues. The main legacy seems to be continuing tension over the still uncompleted iron and steel complex; the contracts had been awarded to the Soviets a decade ago. If there are coincidences of policy over issues in Africa, those are for African reasons, whether they are inviolability of boundaries (as in Ethiopia) or democracy in southern Africa. In the case of Angola, the Soviet Union and Nigeria happen to share a policy with virtually the whole Western world.

Further, communication and search for mutuality of interests during the Carter years brought other benefits to the United States. On issues not central to their own foreign policy concerns, Nigerians came to support and even lobby effectively for stands that were important to Americans. One such instance was the successful Nigerian effort at one international meeting after another to keep the "Zionism as Racism" resolution from being brought to a vote. More recently, Nigeria's forceful position condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and its role in drafting resolutions on Afghanistan and Kampuchea at the nonaligned meeting in New Delhi in February 1981, were important to the United States. Nigeria's participation in the UN force in Lebanon and its lead role in the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad serve American as well as Nigerian interests. Whether or how Nigeria plays an active—and from America's point of view positive—part is bound to depend on other aspects of their

relations and on the vitally important state of communications between the two nations.

There is no mystery about what happens when those communications break down; when, rather than looking to maximize mutuality of interests, the United States divides the world in two and tells others to choose between them; when instead of dealing as equals (acknowledging, of course, that power is not equal), Americans presume to know better than Africans do what is good for Africa. The history of U.S.-Nigerian relations has tested that pattern. Nigerians have never hidden what they see as their vital interests, which have remained constant; thus, their reactions are quite predictable. Some say they ask the United States to act in Africa's interest. That is not so: Nigerians are not naive. But if the United States forces on Nigerians hard, confrontational choices related to their own vital interests and most profoundly held convictions, they will do what they must.

American policy-makers need to understand that such tensions will severely damage carefully nurtured bilateral relations, with problems both forseeable and unpredictable. But Americans should not think that, were the ground of cooperation and mutual respect again to be lost, it could be easily regained.

Talking It Over

A Note for Students and Discussion Groups

This pamphlet, like its predecessors in the HEADLINE Series, is published for every serious reader, specialized or not, who takes an interest in the subject. Many of our readers will be in classrooms, seminars or community discussion groups. Particularly with them in mind, we present below some discussion questions—suggested as a starting point only—and references for further reading.

Discussion Questions

What influence did British rule have on the way Nigeria developed?

Do you think Biafra should have been allowed to secede?

What were the reasons that Nigerians decided to change their British, parliamentary style of government for the American model?

How can the religious and ethnic divisions in Nigeria be overcome to build a national spirit?

What influence does Nigeria have over the rest of Africa? Will Nigeria's influence grow or diminish in the next few years?

How important is Nigeria to the United States? How can the United States continue and improve good relations with Nigeria?

Why does Nigeria appear to have a more stable and democratic government than that of many other African nations?

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Monographs in FPA's Headline Series are published approximately four times a year and are intended as a resource for teachers and students in the foreign policy area. Each monograph: is about a world area or topic; is written by a noted scholar; is brief (usually 64 pages); is written to be highly readable; includes basic background, maps, charts, discussion guides, and suggested reading.

Since their inception in 1935 some 300 monographs have been issued in the Headline Series. Attached is a complete list of Headline Series monographs to date, with ED accession numbers noted for those items that have been input to the ERIC bibliographic database.

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(ERIC Accession Numbers Noted in Far Right Column When Available)

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1	NUMBER	TITLE	AUTHOR	YEAR	MONTH	NUMBER
2	1	War Tomorrow Will We Keep Out	Rylis Alexander Goslin & William T. Stone	1935		1
3	2	Made in the U.S.A.	Rylis Alexander Goslin & John C. DeWilde	1935		2
4	3	Dictatorship	Rylis Alexander Goslin	1936		3
5	4	Peace in Party Platforms	William T. Stone	1936		4
6	5	Clash in the Pacific	T. A. Bisson & Rylis Alexander Goslin	1936		5
7	6	War Drums and Peace Plans	Raymond Leslie Buell & Rylis Alexander Goslin	1936		6
8	7	America Contradicts Herself	Rylis Alexander Goslin & William T. Stone	1936		7
9	8	Cooperatives	Rylis Alexander Goslin	1937	March	8
10	9	Billions for Defense	William T. Stone & Rylis Alexander Goslin	1937		9
11	10	Church and State	Rylis Alexander Goslin	1937		10
12	11	Changing Governments	Rylis Alexander Goslin	1937		11
13	12	Peaceful Change: The Alternative to War	William T. Stone & Clark M. Eichelberger	1937		12
14	13	War in China	Varian Fry	1938	Feb.	13
15	14	The Puzzle of Palestine	David H. Popper	1938		14
16	15	Shadow Over Europe: The Challenge of Nazi Germany	Shepard Stone	1938	Oct.	15
17	16	Bricks Without Mortar: The Story of International Cooperation	Varian Fry	1938	Nov.	16
18	17	The Good Neighbors: The Story of the Two Americas	Delia Goetz & Varian Fry	1939	Feb.	17
19	18	Battle Without Bullets: The Story of Economic Warfare	Thomas Brockway	1939	May	18
20	19	Quest of Empire: The Problem of Colonies	Walter Consuelo Langsam	1939	June	19
21	20	Human Dynamite: The Story of Europe's Minorities	Henry C. Wolfe	1939	Oct.	20
22	21	The Peace that Failed: How Europe Sowed the Seeds of War	Varian Fry	1939	Dec.	21
23	22	New Homes for the Old: Public Housing in Europe & America	William V. Reed & Elizabeth Ogg	1940	Feb.	22
24	23	War Atlas: A Handbook of Maps and Facts	Francis Brown	1940	Apr.	23
25	24	The British Empire Under Fire	James Frederick Green	1940	May	24
26	25	Spotlight on the Balkans	P. B. Stoyan	1940	Aug.	25
27	26	Challenge to the Americas	John I. B. McCulloch	1940	Oct.	26
28	27	Look at Latin America	Joan Raushenbush	1940	Nov.	27
29	28	America Rearms: The Citizen's Guide to National Defense	William T. Stone	1941	Feb.	28
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